Throughout the 1990s, employers have increasingly shifted from Defined Benefits (DB) to Defined Contributions (DC) pensions, where workers have to choose the amount of contributions and the allocation of retirement wealth. To facilitate these decisions, both employers and the government have taken initiatives to foster retirement savings and improve financial literacy via, for example, retirement seminars. At the same time, there has been an explosion in the financial industry of products and tools aimed at improving retirement planning. Have these changes had any impact on savings? We examine this question by comparing the saving behavior of two generations: the Early Baby Boomers (EBB), which are born between 1948 and 1953 and are therefore 51 to 56 years old in 2004 and an earlier cohort (HRS cohort hereafter), which was born between 1936 and 1941 and whose members are 51 to 56 years old in 1992. By examining individuals of the same age but at different points in time, we can assess how being born in different times and being exposed to different economic circumstances affects saving patterns. 2 We find that most EBB accumulated more wealth than the previous generation.
However, this derives mostly by the appreciation in housing equity; measures of nonhousing wealth show little or no changes between cohorts. There is also a sizeable group of EBB who display less rather than more wealth than the HRS cohort. These families are disproportionately those with low educational attainment or minorities, such as Blacks.
The low-often minuscule-amounts of wealth held by many families, not only among the HRS cohort but increasingly so in the EBB cohort, is worrisome as these households are only 10 to 15 years away from retirement. We find that, for both cohorts, lack of wealth can be traced to lack of retirement planning. Notwithstanding the many initiatives aimed at fostering planning in the 1990s, a large portion of EBB still do not plan for retirement even though most respondents are close to it. Irrespective of the changes in the housing and stock market over time, the effect of planning is remarkably similar between cohorts; those who do not plan accumulate much lower amounts of wealth than those who do plan. At the median, non-planners hold 20 percent less wealth than planners, but figures are much higher (closer to 45 percent) for households at lower levels of the wealth distribution. Thus, both in 2004 and in 1992 , lack of planning is tantamount to lack of savings.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we describe the data and compare demographic characteristics and income between the two cohorts. We then examine levels and composition of household wealth. Further, we show that many EBB do not plan for retirement and that wealth varies substantially across degrees of planning.
Finally, we assess the effects of planning on wealth using both quantile and Instrumental Variables (IV) estimation.
Sample and Descriptive Statistics
In our work, we use data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), a nationally representative survey of older Americans over the age of 50 (and their spouses of any age). Specifically, we examine the "Early Boomer" cohort where at least one household member was born between 1948 and 1953 (age 51-56 in 2004) . This group was first surveyed in 2004. We also examine the "HRS cohort" where at least one household member was born between 1936 and 1941 (age 51-56 in 1992) . This group was interviewed in the first wave of the HRS in 1992. By comparing cohorts of the same age (51-56) but in different time periods (2004 versus 1992) , we can assess how being born in a different time and having lived in different economic conditions affects financial behavior.
The EEB are particularly important to study; they are a large generation on the brink of retirement. Earlier studies about the saving behavior of the Baby Boomers have shown mixed results (compare, for example the findings of Bernheim (1993) with the Congressional Budget Office study (1993) ). Similarly, studies which have examined the effects of retirement seminars during the 1990s have found contrasting estimates (for a review, see Lusardi (2004) ). The advantage of our study with respect to previous work is that it utilizes a very rich and detailed source of data about savings and a host of demographic and economic characteristics that can affect wealth holdings.
To carry out the comparison between these two cohorts, we construct demographic variables that are similar across years. In addition, we use the same definition of income and wealth. Specifically, our measure of total net worth includes checking and savings account balances, certificates of deposits and T-bills, bonds, stocks, IRAs and Keoghs, net housing equity, other real estate, net value of own businesses, cars and other vehicles minus debts. Total household income is the sum of labor and capital income, government transfer program income, and other income (gifts, lottery, etc.) . All values are expressed in 2004 dollars and all statistics are weighted using the preliminary weights provided by the HRS for 2004 and the final weights for 1992.
3 Questions about wealth in the HRS are asked to the most knowledgeable member in the household about financial matters-financial respondent hereafter.
To construct the final samples, we delete a handful of observations with missing information about demographic variables such as age, sex, marital status, number of children, and race and ethnicity. Moreover, we delete the observations with zero income as they are likely to be the result of measurement error. The final number of observations is 2,631 for the EBB and 4,577 for the HRS cohort. Table 1 illustrates several important changes in the demographic composition of the two cohorts. First, EBB display higher educational attainment than the HRS cohort.
Not only are EBB more likely to have a college degree or more than college education but they are also less likely to be high-school drop-outs. Second, EBB are less likely to be married and more likely to have experienced a family break-up; the number of divorced increased from 14.8 percent in 1992 to 21.6 percent in 2004. Consequently, the number of families with children decreased over the time period. These changes were also noted in several other papers in this volume (Iams, Butrica and Smith; Manchester, Weaver, and Whitman; Wolfe, Haveman, Holden and Romanov) . As expected, the proportion of Hispanic households increases from 1992 to 2004 (from 7.6 percent to 8.7 percent), while the proportion of Whites declined. 4 Because wealth varies substantially across demographic groups and it is strongly affected by education, marital status, and race, it is important to keep these changes into account when examining household wealth holdings.
Table 1 here
Another important change over this period concerns the distribution of total household income between the EBB and the HRS cohort (Table 2) . Both the mean and median income among EBB was higher than the HRS cohort. If increases in household income are a proxy for increases in permanent income between the two cohorts, we expect wealth among EBB to have increased as a result of these changes in lifetime resources. Note, however, that EBB households below the median income report lower income than the households in the HRS cohort, perhaps as a result of the stagnation in wages for workers without a college degree during the 1990s (Autor, Katz, Kearney 2006; Autor and Katz 1999) . Since the households at the bottom of the income distribution are disproportionately those with low education, unmarried, and Blacks and Hispanics, we expect these groups to have more difficulties accumulating wealth in 2004 than in 1992.
Table 2 here
The distribution of total net worth is displayed in Table 3A . When considering the mean and the third quartile, the EBB have accumulated more wealth than households in the HRS generation and differences are statistically significant between cohorts.
However, consistent with the data on income discussed before, EBB in the lower quartile of the wealth distribution have accumulated lower amounts of wealth than the HRS cohort, although differences are not statistically significant (see also Table 4 ). These households are disproportionately those with low income and low education. Not only are these households more likely to display lower amount of wealth in 2004, but they are also more likely to be in debt. Note that, for both cohorts, the distribution of total net worth is very wide. Thus, there exist large differences in wealth even when looking at a narrow age group.
One major change the EBB experienced, particularly during 2002 and 2003, is a large increase in home prices. Thus, the increase in wealth among EBB may simply be the result of the appreciation in home equity. The distribution of total non-housing wealth in Table 3B shows that housing equity plays an important role in the level and composition of wealth of both generations. First, most households in both generations hold little beside housing wealth. Moreover, when we subtract housing equity, we find that, not only the households at the bottom of the wealth distribution, but even the median household in the EBB holds lower non-housing wealth than the previous generation.
Thus, a large part of the increase in wealth between the two generations is in housing equity. This is also confirmed in our tests. When we compare mean wealth holdings between cohorts, we find a statistically higher total net worth in 2004 as compared to 1992. However, the difference is simply driven by housing wealth; there are no statistically significant differences in mean non-housing wealth between cohorts.
Tables 3A and 3B here
The distribution of total net worth in the population hides some important differences across demographic groups. This is important to consider in view of the changes in demographic characteristics reported previously (Table 1 ). Table 4 shows that EBB with low educational attainment and minorities, such as Blacks, display lower amounts of wealth than the HRS cohort. Only EEB households with a college degree (or higher degrees) have higher wealth than HRS cohort with the same educational attainment. Note that, for EBB with less than a college degree, the amounts are lower throughout the wealth distribution. Moreover, a sizable proportion of the EBB with low education and Blacks and Hispanics arrive at retirement with minuscule amounts of wealth, raising concerns about their future well-being into retirement. Finally, the distribution of wealth remains wide even within demographic groups in both years. Thus, there are many differences in the pattern of wealth even when we consider similar households in terms of both age and economic status. Other factors rather than age, income, and macro shocks influence wealth. Later, we show that lack of wealth both in the total sample and even after accounting for demographic characteristics can be traced to lack of retirement planning.
We turn now to the composition of wealth between these two generations, which is illustrated in Table 5 and Figures 1A-1B . This is important in view of the large changes in both the stock and housing market during the 1990s, which could have influenced the wealth of EBB. Clearly one of the most important assets held by both generations is the home. Not only did home-ownership increase slightly between the two generations (differences are significant but only at the 10 percent level of significance), but home equity accounts for a third of total net worth among the EBB. When we sum together home equity and other real estate -an asset prominent among wealthier households-the amount of wealth accounted for by total real estate is close to 50 percent for EBB, while it was 43.8 percent for the HRS cohort. Thus, exposure to the housing market has increased for the EBB compared to the HRS cohort. only at the top of the wealth distribution. Thus, while the vast majority of EBB and HRS households are exposed to the fluctuations in the housing market, a much smaller group of households is exposed to the fluctuations in the stock market. This finding is compounded by the fact that households in both cohorts hold large amounts of home equity, at least in relationship to their total wealth, while most households hold small amounts of stocks and IRAs. Lusardi and Mitchell (2006b) show that, if home prices by region in 2004 were to return to their levels of 2002-an average reduction of about 13 percent-EBB would lose approximately 9 percent of total wealth. A reduction of similar magnitude in stock prices would reduce the wealth of EBB by only 2 percent (see also Gustman and Steinmeier 2002) . This exercise is important because it shows that asset prices (mostly home prices) can play a major role in explaining changes in the distribution of wealth between generations. Most EBB have benefited from a remarkable increase in home prices, which lifted their wealth with respect to the previous generation.
However, it is not clear yet whether this change is long-lasting.
Figures 1A and 1B here
Another asset that merits consideration is business equity. While business owners account for a small fraction of the population, they account for a sizable amount of total wealth (Gentry and Hubbard 2004; Hurst and Lusardi 2006) . For example, while close to 15 percent of EBB are business owners, the amount of wealth held in business equity among EBB is as large as the amount of wealth held in IRAs, even though 41.6 percent of EBB hold IRAs. Business owners are disproportionately located at the top of the wealth distribution. Using data from the HRS in 1992, Hurst and Lusardi (2006) show that as many of 82 percent of households in the top 3 percent of the wealth distribution are business owners. The percentage of business owners has decreased between cohorts and so is the share of total wealth invested in business equity. Since we rarely have all the relevant information to account for the differences between business owners and other households, in our empirical work, we exclude the business owners from our sample.
Before turning to an important determinant of total net worth in the next section, we need to mention that our analysis is limited to a narrow measure of wealth: total net worth, which includes IRAs and Keoghs but no other measures of pension and Social Security wealth. This is a limitation because, as Gustman and Steinmeier (1999) show, pension and Social Security wealth can account for as much as much half of total wealth.
However, we do not have yet an accurate measure of these two components of total wealth for the EBB cohort. Moreover, as Cunningham, Engelhardt and Kumar in this volume show, current calculations of pension wealth may be affected by large errors.
Explaining Differences in Wealth Holdings: The Role of Planning
The previous analysis shows that the distribution of wealth among EBB and HRS is very wide. Differences in wealth in both cohorts persist even when looking within demographic groups. While wealth holdings were lifted by the home price increase, a sizable proportion of EBB arrives close to retirement with very small amounts of wealth.
However, throughout the 1990s, there has been an explosion of initiatives aimed to foster savings. As mentioned before, many employers, particularly large ones and those offering DC pensions, have started offering retirement seminars to workers. Moreover, both the government and the financial industry have been active in promoting planning and saving for retirement. Have these initiatives had any impacts on household saving behavior? Lusardi (1999) was the first to point out that many households do not plan for retirement, even when only 5 to 10 years away from it. This finding has been confirmed in other studies using different surveys, such as the Retirement Confidence Survey and the TIAA-CREF Survey (see, among others, Yakoboski and Dikemper 1997 and Ameriks, Caplin and Leahy 2003) . Most importantly, Lusardi (1999 Lusardi ( , 2002 Lusardi ( , 2003 shows that planning is a powerful determinant of wealth; those who do not plan arrive at retirement with much lower amounts of wealth than those who plan.
In addition to providing a module on planning and financial literacy, the HRS in 2004 re-introduced a question about retirement planning that was present in the 1992 wave. 5 Thus, it is possible to examine how planning has changed between these two generations and whether and how much planning affects household wealth among EBB. Table 6 reports the degree of planning between the two cohorts and the distribution of wealth among different planning types. Several important facts emerge from these tables.
First, the proportion of non-planners (those who have thought about retirement "hardly at all") decreased among EBB compared to the HRS and the change in planning is statistically significant. However, a still large fraction of EBB, 27.5 percent, does not seem to have given any thought to retirement, even though they are only 5 to 10 years away. Second, planning is strongly correlated with wealth. Those who plan accumulate much larger amounts of wealth than non-planners. Looking at medians, planners hold double the amount of wealth than non-planners and differences are even larger at the first quartile of the wealth distribution. Note that many non-planners have accumulated very little wealth, while planners have accumulated up to 7 times the amount of wealth of nonplanners. Thus, for several households, lack of planning is tantamount to lack of savings.
Note, however, there is not much difference in mean net worth between planning categories. This is because there are several extremely wealthy households who have not given any thought to retirement. We will later examine the impact of these households on estimates of the effect of planning. Finally, the effect of planning is strikingly similar between the two cohorts. Thus, the relationship between planning and wealth does not seem to have been much influenced by changes in home prices, changes in stock prices, or increases in financial education during the 1990s. Table 6 here Which households are more likely to be planners? In Figures 2A-2C , we report the proportion of planner types across education, sex, race, and across year/cohort. The large majority of those with less than a high school education are non-planners. This is the case not only in the HRS cohort, but also among EBB. The proportion of non-planners decreases as we move to higher education levels, but the share of non-planners across education groups is very similar between the two cohorts. This means that planning is strongly linked to education, although there is also a sizeable fraction of nonplanners among those with college and higher degrees. Since educational attainment has increased during the 1990s, this may explain why the fraction of non-planners has decreased in the same time period. Similarly, while financial education programs have been undertaken during the 1990s, many low income and minority workers were not exposed to such programs (see Lusardi 2004) . This may explain why lack of planning tends to persist among these groups over time.
Planning is also strongly correlated with race: non-planners are disproportionately concentrated among Blacks and Hispanics. However, it is encouraging to see that the proportion of non-planners among Blacks and Hispanics tend to decrease between the two cohorts. There are also differences in planning between women and men; women are more likely to be non-planners both in 1992 and 2004. Lusardi and Mitchell (2006a,b) further show that planning is strongly correlated with financial literacy; those who can do simple calculations and understand the working of inflation, interest compounding, and risk diversification are also more likely to plan.
Figures 2A, 2B,2C here
Do the large differences in wealth across planning type persist when we account for demographic characteristic and income? Has the effect of planning changed over time? We turn now to a multivariate analysis of the effect of planning on wealth between the two cohorts. To construct the final sample, we first delete business owners from our sample. As reported in Lusardi (2004, 2006) Given there are such sharp differences between planners and non-planners (Table   6 ), we construct a simple dummy for lack of planning (No planning) that takes the value 1 when households report they have given hardly any thought to retirement. We include in the regressions other major determinants of wealth: age (and age squared), number of children, dummies for marital status, education, sex, race and ethnicity and whether the financial respondent is partially or fully retired. In addition, we include total household income. 7 Together with race and education, income serves as a proxy for permanent income, i.e., lifetime income. Given that the distribution of wealth is skewed to the right, we perform quartile regressions rather than Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regressions.
The empirical estimates are provided in Tables 7A and 7B . Even after accounting for many demographic characteristics and income, the coefficient estimate of lack of planning is always negative and statistically significant at each of the three quartiles of the wealth distribution in each cohort and in the pooled sample. The estimates are not only sizeable but they are very similar between cohorts (in the pooled sample, the interaction term between no planning and the 2004 year dummy is mostly not statistically significant). Irrespective of the changes throughout the 1990s, lack of planning continues to have the same effect: it sharply reduces wealth. Looking at medians, non-planners accumulate from $17,000 to $20,000 less wealth than those who do some (a little or a lot)
planning. This corresponds to approximately 20 percent less wealth. This is consistent with estimates from previous studies (Lusardi 1999 (Lusardi , 2003 Ameriks, Caplin and Leahy 2003) that also show that lack of planning has an effect on wealth even after accounting for many determinants of wealth. It is also consistent with estimates from the 2004 HRS using a different measure of planning (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2006a Whites, but the effect is particularly pronounced among Blacks. Family break-ups, such as divorce and separation, are also a detriment to wealth accumulation. The effect of divorce in both the median and third quartile estimates is much larger among the EBB than the previous generation. Having more children also leads to lower wealth holdings.
The effect of planning persists when we examine a different measure of wealth. In Table 8 , we consider median regressions of total non-housing wealth. 8 Lack of planning continues to be statistically significant and negative both across years and in the pooled sample. Thus, planning affects other components of wealth beyond housing equity. This result is to be expected as the effect of planning is similar between cohorts while housing equity increased substantially before 2004. Table 8 here
Interpreting the Effect of Planning
The previous estimates show that the effect of planning on wealth is sizeable.
How do we interpret the effect of lack of planning on wealth? To better understand this effect, in Table 9 , we first report the median and OLS estimates of lack of planning on net worth. For brevity, only the estimates in the pooled sample are reported. Note that the OLS estimates of lack of planning are barely significant. This shows that the choice of estimation technique is critical to assess the effect of planning and, most importantly, that at high levels of wealth, planning may cease to matter. Table 9 here
To understand this finding further, in Figure 3A and 3B we report the effects of non-planning at each percentile of the wealth distribution. The figures report the estimates and the 95 percent confidence intervals. Note that up to the 80 th percentile of the wealth distribution, the estimates are negative (lack of planning leads to lower wealth) and the confidence intervals are narrow enough to make the estimates statistically significant. While estimates become more negative as we move to higher values of wealth, as a proportion of wealth, lack of planning is particularly dire at the bottom of the wealth distribution. For example, for those households in the HRS cohort in the third decile of wealth, lack of planning is associated with a 30 percent reduction in wealth, while lack of planning in the sixth decile is associated with 13 percent lower wealth.
Estimates are even higher among the EBB. Lack of planning in the third decile is linked to 45 percent less wealth holdings, while lack of planning in the sixth decile is linked to 25 percent less wealth.
The effect of lack of planning reverses as we move close to the top of the wealth distribution. Among EBB, as we move past the third quartile of wealth, the effect of lack of planning first becomes insignificant and then positive rather than negative. The same is true for the HRS cohort, even though the effect happens at higher percentiles of the wealth distribution. This was already evident in Table 6 ; the distribution of wealth among non-planners is very wide and includes several wealthy households. Given that these households can become influential observations in the OLS estimates, one has to be very careful in assessing the empirical estimates of lack of planning on wealth.
Figures 3A and 3B here
Our next goal is to show that planning has a causal influence on wealth. In other words, if someone were to begin planning tomorrow, he/she would end up with larger net worth because of it. However, since planning is potentially a decision variable, wealth could also influence planning through reverse causality. Therefore, a different estimation technique than simply OLS is necessary to establish the causal relationship. One reason reverse causality is a concern is that wealthy individuals may plan more because they have more to gain from planning, driving the significance of the coefficient in the OLS and quantile regressions. However, it is also possible that extremely wealthy individuals plan less because they do not need to plan in order to build wealth, biasing the coefficient in the previous regressions toward zero.
There is another important reason why the effects of planning on wealth are difficult to interpret. One worry, for example, is that there is an unobserved third factor, such as discipline, impatience, or cognitive ability, that is responsible for the observed correlation between planning and wealth. The IV strategy explained below will take care of this concern too. Previous research has accounted for reverse causality by using instruments for planning (Lusardi 2003; Ameriks, Caplin and Leahy 2003) . Here, we develop a test to examine directly whether reverse causality exists by using an instrument for wealth. The instrument must first provide an exogenous change in wealth, one outside the control of the individual and uncorrelated with his or her preferences. If this exogenous change in wealth is uncorrelated with planning after accounting for all controls, then it allows us to test for reverse causality.
To assess the economic importance of reverse causality, we first run a regression where the dependent variable is now lack of planning and the regressors include net worth and all of the demographic variables considered before, including income. The estimates in Table 10 show only a mild evidence of reverse causality. The effect of wealth is negative -higher wealth tends to decrease lack of planning-but the estimate are percentage points in the pooled sample . Given that the estimates of wealth may be affected by influential observations, we also used a cubic transformation of wealth, but results are similar.
9 Table 10 here
We now perform IV estimation as net worth is clearly an endogenous variable.
The instrument we use for net worth is recent changes in housing prices by region. This measure should be strongly correlated with wealth because, as reported before (Table 5) ,
housing is a large component of total net worth for both cohorts. Because we exploit variation by region and not at the individual level, these price changes are not likely to be correlated with the individual propensity to plan except through the channel of net worth.
As mentioned before, the EBB enjoyed a sharp increase in home prices both For a similar wealth transformation, see Haliassos and Bertaut (1995) . 10 Hurst and Lusardi (2004) have used similar instruments for wealth to be able to assess the effect of wealth on business start-ups.
As the first stage regressions reported in Table 11 show, changes in regional prices are strong predictors of wealth; a 1 percent increase in home prices increases wealth by more than $16,000 among EBB, while a 1 percent decrease in prices during the early 1990s increased wealth by close to $5,000, perhaps a result of the fact that home prices had decreased sharply before that period and, consequently, had already depressed the value of wealth. 11 In the pooled sample, the increase in wealth following a change in home prices is also positive. The IV estimates reported in Table 12 show that the effect of wealth-instrumented by changes in home prices-on lack of planning is either not statistically significant or positive. In addition, in both 1992 and 2004, the positive IV estimates are significantly different than the negative OLS point estimates; for both cohorts, exogenous increases in wealth tend to reduce the propensity to plan.
12

Tables 11 and 12 here
If this is the case and if lack of planning is positively influenced by wealth, the OLS estimates are biased and represent an under-estimate of the effect of planning. This is what Lusardi (2003) finds in her IV estimates on the 1992 HRS data. The IV estimates of lack of planning on wealth are much larger than the OLS estimates. This is also consistent with the estimates of Ameriks, Caplin and Leahy (2003) , who uses a different data set and use propensity to plan for a vacation and mathematical abilities as instruments for planning.
To summarize: Planning is an important determinant of wealth and an important reason for why many families arrive close to retirement with little or no wealth. Both the quantile estimates and the IV exercise show that planning has a powerful effect on wealth. The IV estimation shows that reverse causality is not driving the significant relationship between wealth and lack of planning. In fact, reverse causality tends to result in an under-estimation of the effect of planning. Thus, the effect of planning is even stronger than the OLS and quantile estimates report. Moreover and most importantly, the effect of planning has remained unchanged between years. Thus, while the increase in home prices has lifted the wealth of many EBB, lack of planning has the same effect between cohorts: it sharply reduces wealth.
Conclusion
As EBB transition to retirement, a number of questions arise concerning their well-being into the future. In comparison to the HRS cohort in 1992, many EBB have accumulated larger amounts of wealth in 2004. However, this is not true for the whole cohort; many EBB families whose respondent is Black or has low education have accumulated less wealth than the previous generation. Moreover, with respect to the HRS cohort, a larger proportion of EBB wealth is exposed to fluctuations in asset prices, particularly housing prices. Thus, a decline in the housing market may generate substantial losses. Given that most EBB are home-owners and the housing market has experienced very rapid increases in the last few years, the behavior of this market should be watched carefully.
While several initiatives have been undertaken during the 1990s to foster retirement planning, a large fraction of EBB have still not given much thought to retirement even though they are only a few years away from it. Lack of planning is a crucial determinant of household wealth; those who do not plan accumulate much smaller amounts of wealth than those who do some planning. Estimates of the effect of planning are hard to assess because there is a small but influential group of the population that does not plan but holds high amounts of wealth. Nonetheless, for both EBB and the HRS cohort, lack of planning is tantamount to lack of savings. The effect of lack of planning is strikingly similar between cohorts. This is potentially due to the fact that non-planners are disproportionately those with low education, low income, and Blacks or Hispanics. Those households were not only largely unaffected by changes in the stock market, but they have been also left untouched by financial education programs instituted during the 1990s. Public policies that aim to stimulate savings should consider incentives and programs that stimulate retirement planning. To be effective, these programs should better target those groups least likely to plan.
In sum: EBB have higher amounts of wealth than the HRS cohort but this is hardly the result of an increase in retirement planning. Close to 30 percent of respondents in both cohorts have not given any thoughts to retirement, even thought they are not far away from it. Lack of planning leads to low-often minuscule-amounts of savings. The effect of planning is remarkably similar between cohorts. Thus, non-planners have not been much affected by the changes in the economy between 1992 and 2004, including the financial education initiatives undertaken during the 1990s. Note: Percentages of respondent in each planning group are conditional on being asked the planning question. At least respondent or spouse is 51-56 years old. All figures are weighted using household weights. Note: This table reports OLS regressions of total net worth on the percentage increase in housing prices by region in the previous year. Net worth is divided by 1,000. Regressions include dummies for retirement status (fully and partially retired), number of children, age and age squared. The total number of observations is 3,727 in 1992, 2,156 in 2004, and 5,883 in the pooled sample. Business owners and the top and bottom 1% of the wealth distribution in each year are excluded. Standard errors in parentheses. * Significant at 10% ** Significant at 5% *** Significant at 1%. .
